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PREFACE
One of the major social questions facing America concerns the 
role of consumer advertising, its necessity, its pertinency, its 
honesty, and its responsibilities. Some popular advertising 
cynically manipulates the consumer and some of the most blatant of 
such abuses are found in the field of health products, specifically 
in the proprietary drug area. The advertising for these products 
often encourages the consuming public to diagnose and treat themselves 
for numerous physical ailments, real or imagined- Such preoccupation 
with health has created a vast public clinic— the media of the 
country— in which matters of health and personal care are treated-
While the regulation of advertising and promotion of ethical 
drugs— those advertised directly to physicians— is now tightly con­
trolled by constant and severe federal regulation, similar sur­
veillance of practices in advertising and promotion of proprietaries 
has historically been inadequate. This study is concerned with the 
question of why the regulation of proprietary drugs did not develop 
coincidentally with that of ethical preparations. An analysis of the 
historical development of controls over all types of drug promotion 
will document the administrative duplication, personal rivalry, 
shortsightedness, and erratic implementation which has impeded 
totally effective federal control of false and deceptive advertising. 
Of a remarkable nature is the extent to which administrative practice
ii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and judicial interpretation, rather than Congressional legislation, 
determined the pattern of the development of federal regulation 
of drug advertising.
The source materials for this thesis were the records of 
litigation in the federal courts. Congressional records, debates and 
reports, biographies of notable figures involved, contemporary 
newspaper and magazine accounts and commentaries, and the reform 
tracts which exposed some abuses and were, in fact, to some degree 
instrumental in the progress of regulation.
iii
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
P R E F A C E ..................................   ii
CHAPTER
I. THE REFORM PERIOD 1889-1906   . . . . .  1
Advertising Abuses 
Reform Leaders
II. THE PURE FOOD AND DRUG ACT AND THE SHERLEY
AMENDMENT 1906-1912   7
The Wiley Act 
Problems of Enforcement
III. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE YEARS OF
VACUUM 1912-1933 ....................................   22
The Jurisdictional Question 
The Courts' Decisions
IV. THE PERIOD OF DIVISION: THE WHEELER-LEA AND
COPELAND ACTS 1933-1948     42
The Need for Legislation
The Advertising-Labeling Question
The FTC and the FDA
V. SOME RECENT EVENTS......................................  63
VI. CONCLUSION.............................................  . , 66
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....................................  . . . . . . . .  68
XV
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER I 
THE REFORM PERIOD 
1889-1906
During the nineteenth century the federal and state governments 
did very little to regulate the quality, purity, methods of preparation, 
or content of food and drugs, much less to control spurious advertising. 
In 1848 the federal government enacted legislation against the import 
of adulterated drugs. An attempt to secure comp retiens ive national 
protection against the adulteration and misbranding of food and drugs in 
1879 was unsuccessful. Limited legislation against food and drug 
adulteration was enacted In 1888 for the District of Columbia alone 
and, in 1889, Senator Algernon S. Paddock of NebrSiska introduced a bill 
which would have granted investigatory and control powers to the 
Department of Agriculture in the areas of food and drug production, 
advertisement, and sale.^ But Senator Paddock's measure, receiving 
little support in the Congress and* virtually none throughout the 
country, failed.
^Harry Aubrey Toulmln, Jr. , The Law of Foods, Drugs and 
Cosmetics (Cincinnati: The W. H. Anderson Company, 1963), p. 500.
^Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., The Health of a K^atlon (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 80.
James S. Turner, The Chemical Feast: The Ralph Nader Study 
Group Report on Food Protection and the Food and Drug Administration 
(New York: Grossman Publishers, 1970), p. 107.
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For the next decade. Congress considered no significant legis­
lation in the area of regulation of food and drug practices, and abuses 
became increasingly flagrant. Headache powders used narcotic substances 
as the base; some pain killers were potentially dangerous depressants; 
cough remedies intended for use by children and babies frequently 
contained opium and morphine. Moreover, advertising and labeling did 
not disclose content, qualitatively or quantitatively.^
Control of drug promotion in this period was literally non­
existent, though the advertising was ubiquitous and almost uniformly 
deceitful. Print advertising for B and M Remedy, for example, 
"guaranteed" the alleviation of the following ailments:
Asthma, ataxia, bronchitis, blood poisoning, bowel trouble, 
coughs, colds, catarrh, cancer, dyspepsia, dandruff, eczema, 
fevers, gallstones, goiter, gout, hay-fever, influenza, grippe, 
leuchorrhea, lumbago, laryngitis, neuritis, neuralgia, 
pneumonia, pleurisy, skin diseases, tuberculosis, tumors.
Drug advertising, in fact, played a major role in the proprietary 
medicine and publishing industries. The W. T. Hanson Company was 
reported to have spent $500,000 annually on advertising for Pink Pills 
for Pale People. Similar expenditures were reported for Paine's Celery 
Compound and Buchu Compound.̂  The Director of the Bureau of Chemistry 
in the Department of Agriculture was later quoted as saying that "the
^Morton Mintz. The Therapeutic Nightmare (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1965), p. 42.
^Arthur Kallet and F. J. Schlink, 100,000.000 Guinea Pigs (New 
York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1933), pp. 137-40.
W. Ryerson, "Advertising in the Drug Business," Scientific 
American. October 5, 1895, p. 214.
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amount of blood money coming in from patent medicine advertisements in 
this country at the beginning of the century I estimate to have been 
about a hundred million dollars annually.”^
Some appeals for legislation appeared during the 1890’s, but 
most of these were concerned primarily with food inspection.^ A 
national food and drug law was considered the ideal solution, but a
Quniformity of state laws was recognized to be a more realistic goal.® 
False advertising was infrequently mentioned, and the philosophy of 
caveat emptor was, for the most part, unchallenged. Government inter­
ference in trade practices, such as advertisings was uncommon, and, 
as a New York state court remarked in 1891, "all persons must be 
presumed to have in common (the liberty) of suffering themselves to
be humbugged."9
There were a number of leading participants in the reform move­
ment, but Dr. Harvey Washington Wiley, Edward Bok, Samuel Hopkins Adams, 
and Upton Sinclair were probably the most influential. The increase 
in the size and intensity of the reform movement after 1901 can be
^Mintz, The Therapeutic Nightmare, p. 43.
H. C. Wood, "Facts About Nostrums," Popular Science, June, 1906,
p. 531.
^"Home Responsibility," Outlook. June 2, 1894, p. 996.
"The Development of Pure Food Legislation," Science. April 15, 
1898. pp. 505-13.
"Senatorial Investigation of Food Adulteration," Science,
June 19, 1899, p. 794.
®"Pure Food Reform," Outlook. June 16, 1900* pp. 400-6.
"Our Chaotic Food Laws," Nation. July 30, 1903, p. 88.
^L. J. Vance, "Evolution of Patent Medicine," Popular 
Science. May, 1891, p. 76.
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traced in part to the writings and lectures of these men.
The first and most dedicated (in terms of years and effort 
spent for legislative reform) was Dr. Harvey Washington Wiley. Wiley, 
a medical doctor with a Ph.D. in chemistry, had not only campaigned for 
effective food and drug laws since 1885, but had worked actively as 
well to identify deficiencies and to improve techniques for pro­
tecting and preserving edibles. Through the position of Chief of the 
Bureau of Chemistry, Department of Agriculture, Wiley had the 
opportunity to oversee all commercial practices in food, drugs, cos­
metics, and pesticides. However, without the power to enforce, he was 
left virtually impotent in practice. At this point, the Interstate 
Commerce Commission held the sole power of regulation of business 
activities in the United States, as derived from the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act of June 2, 1890, but the Act was limited only to the prohibition 
of combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade.
Nevertheless, Dr. Wiley and his supporters continued to direct 
their efforts at reform, specifically at the misbranding, mislabeling, 
and fallacious advertising prevalent in the food and drug industries. 
For example, one of Wiley’s colleagues. Professor E. F. Ladd, Food 
Commissioner of North Dakota, reported nationally that "potted chicken" 
and "potted turkey" sold commercially contained in fact no chicken or 
turkey; that the quantity of maple syrup labeled "Vermont" sold in
lOsherman Anti-Trust Act, 26 Stat. 209.
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the United States each year exceeded the total maple syrup production 
of Vermont several times over; that 70 per cent of the chocolate on 
the market was ersatz.
The work of three other reform-minded writers also assisted in 
broadcasting the dangers of impure food and drugs. Hr. Edward W. Bok,
, editor of the Ladies* Home Journal, had refused to accept advertising
1 tSfor patent medicines in 1892. In May of 1903, he wrote an expose of a 
number of popular proprietary medicines, notably Lydia Pinkham 
Vegetable Compound and Hostetler's Stomach Bitters. T h i s  article, 
and six which followed,caused several popular remedies to.be 
withdrawn from the market.
^^Robert S. Roe, "The Food and Drug Act: Past, Present,
and Future," in The Impact of the Food and Drug Administration on 
Our Society, ed. by Henry Welch and Felix Marti-Ibanez (New York:
HD Publications, Inc., 1956), p. 15.
l^Edward W. Bok, The Americanization of Edward Bok (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), p. 340.
^^Edward W. Bok, "Patent Medicine Curse," Ladies' Home Journal. 
May, 1904, p. 18.
l^Edward W. Bok, "Few Words to the W.C.T.U.," Ladies' Home 
Journal. September, 1904, p. 16; "Patent Medicines," Ladies' Home 
Journal. September, 1904, p. 18; "How the Private Confidences of 
Women Are Laughed At," Ladies* Home Journal. November, 1904, p.18;
"Why Patent Medicines Are Dangerous,” Ladies' Home Journal. March, 1905, 
p. 18; "Diabolical Patent Medicine Story," Ladies' Home Journal.
April, 1905, p. 20; "To You: A Personal Word," Ladies' Home
Journal. February, 1906, p. 20.
^^Anderson, The Health of a Nation, pp. 156—7.
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6
Following the s.erxes in the Ladies' Home Journal, a second 
popular publication. Collier's Weekly, commissioned another reformer, 
Samuel Hopkins Adams, to continue the exposure of patent medicines.
Adams concentrated on the alcohol content in many popular remedies and 
on the power of the manufacturers' advertising expenditures to affect 
newspaper content.
Another major force in the eventual success of the campaign for 
food and drug legislation was the appearance in 1906 of Upton Sinclair's 
The Jungle. This expose of the practices in government food 
inspections and the conditions in the slaughterhouses of Chicago 
brought to the surface the need for national legislation.
^^Samuel Hopkin Adams, The Great American Fraud (New York: 
Reprinted from Collier's Weekly. 1906).
^^Upton Sinclair, The Jungle (New York: Doubleday, Page and
Company, 1906).
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CHAPTER II 
THE PURE FOOD AND DRUG ACT 
I AND THE SHERLEY AMENDMENT
I 1906-1912 ■
In a message to Congress on December 5, 1905, President Theodore 
Roosevelt recommended enactment of a law to-regulate interstate 
commerce in misbranded and adulterated foods, drinks, and drugs. He 
suggested that such a law would protect legitimate manufacture and 
commerce and would tend to secure the health and welfare of the 
consuming public. Traffic in foodstuffs which have been debased or 
adulterated so as to injure health or to deceive purchasers should be 
forbidden, he asserted. On December 6, Weldon B. Heyburn introduced 
the Federal Pure Food and Drug bill.
The Pure Food and Drug bill did not receive the newspaper atten­
tion it might have if introduced at another time. In addition to the 
headline news of revolution in Russia, contemporary newspapers focused 
most attention on other elements of the President's message. The 
question of tariff revision and the maximum railroad rate proposal were 
the objects of major controversy. The New York Times of December 5,
1905, expressed the common feeling in business circles of the day that 
government's role does not include interference in business life.
"The President cannot get it out of his mind," the Times asserted, "that 
the big corporations must be controlled at Washington— by the 'sovereign.'"^
^"Congress Opens," New York Times. December 5, 1905, p. 8.
7
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But other newspapers and periodicals did express approval of 
Roosevelt's message. In addition to the continuing support for a food 
an<i drug bill by the Ladles* Home Journal and Collier's Weekly, 
periodicals such as World's Work complained about nearly twenty years 
of Senate obstruction of a pure food law. Outlook repeated the
Owarnings of cocaine and morphine contents.
However, many newspapers remained silent because of advertising 
revenue from patent drug manufacturers.^ Charities and the Commons 
printed prominently a letter from the manager of one of the largest 
proprietary companies in the country charging, in part, that, "Illiberal 
physicians, jealously desirous of a complete monopoly, are taking 
advantage of the present mania for muck-raking and psuedo reform to 
serve their own selfish purposes."^
Perhaps the lead editorial in the New York Daily Tribune on 
December 6 best summed up the sentiments expressed by most newspapers 
and periodicals;
Some of his suggestions involve, if not novel conceptions 
of the functions of the federal government, far reaching 
efforts to adapt its instrumentalities to the new conditions
^H. B- Needham, "Story of the Pure Food Bill in the Senate," 
World's Work. February, 1906, pp. 7206-11.
^"Creating Customers for Dangerous Drugs,” Outlook. April 7, 1906, 
pp. 778-9.
^H. C. Wood, "Facts About Nostrums," Popular Science. June, 1906, 
pp. 531-6.
H. Gove, "In Defense of Patent Medicines," Charities and the 
Commons. April 13, 1907, p. 85.
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under which, with the evolution of our business life, they 
must work.
The President wisely lays stress on the fact that at the 
I present day much work which was formerly done by state 
i authorities can no longer efficiently be performed by them.
I During the six-month period between the introduction of the
legislation and late May of 1906 the Pure Food bill itself was over­
shadowed by the controversy over the general question of government 
control of business practices, especially with regard to the 
railroad rate bill and the meat inspection bill. The newspapers of the 
day carried virtually daily coverage of these bills during the period.
Popular support for regulation of food and drug products had 
in the meantime become what the New York Daily Tribune termed "the 
apparently strong tide" for passage. Thus, as a June vote approached, 
public support for legislation became more strident. The Tribune 
conjectured that the "fabricators of fraudulent food products and the 
makers of patent medicines" would probably have again succeeded in 
killing a strong bill "had not [the legislators] begun to hear from 
their constituents in no uncertain terms.
In Congress, in the end, there was very little disagreement
8or even discussion of the pure food and drug legislation. Joseph W. 
Bailey of Texas and Porter J. MeCumber of North Dakota engaged in mild
^New York Daily Tribune. December 6, 1905, p. 8.
^New York Daily Tribune. June 21, 1906, p. 8.
®U.S. Congress, Senate, 59th Cong., 1st sess., June 27, 28, 29, 
1906, Congressional Record. XL, 9379, 9381, 9495, 9655.
U.S. Congress, House, 59th Cong., 1st sess., June 29, 1906, 
Congressional Record. XL, 9735, 9740. This record contains only 
approximately 8 1/2 pages devoted to the bill, including two full 
readings.
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discussion of the possible violation of the proposed measure on the 
doctrine of "states rights," but Mr. Bailey was satisfied that the 
threat was not s e r i o u s .  ̂ a question concerning the powers of the 
Secretary of Agriculture to determine standards was s e t t l e d . A  con­
ference committee considered the variant House and Senate provisions 
and because "the House bill differed In only a very few respects from 
the provisions of the Senate bill," the bill emerged from the conference 
committee with favorable agreement.
On June 25, 1906, the bill passed Congress and on June 30, 1906 
Theodore Roosevelt signed the Pure Food and Drug Act Into law.
Even previous opponents or critics of the bill now applauded Its 
passage. Although the actual blll-slgnlng occasion was vastly over­
shadowed In the press by the sensational murder of Stanford White by 
Harry K. Thaw the previous evening (the ceremony was noted In one 
paragraph on page 4 In the New York Times) , It was unanimously lauded 
by the major publications and by the President himself,
The lead editorial In the previously ardently critical New York 
Times on June 30, 1906, stated that never had so much been done, first, 
to extend the federal power of regulation and control over the business
^U.S. Congress, Senate, 59th Cong., 1st sess,, June 28, 1906, 
Congressional Record. XL, 9495, 9496.
lOlbld.
l^Ibld, at 9496.
"Farewell to Congress," Washington Post. June 30, 1906, p. 6. 
"Praise from Roosevelt," Washington Post. July 1, 1906, p. 1. 
"Work of Congress Done," New York Daily Tribune. June 30, 1906,
p. 6.
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of the country and, second, to cure and prevent abuses of corporate 
privilege. The editorial praised the Congress' "unaccustomed" attempt 
to meet the people's demands for protection of restraints against trade, 
monopoly abuses, unfair discriminations, and the preparation and 
sale of adulterated and unwholesome food products. Finally, the 
editorial declared, "The Pure Food and Drug bill brings up with a round 
turn a multitude of the countries meanest swindlers— the detestable 
wretches who sell all manner of alimentary and medicinal preparations 
under lying labels.
It is of ironic passing interest that the same issue of the 
Times carried advertisements for Warner's Safe Cure for Kidney Disease. 
Carter's Little Liver Pills ("Absolutely Cure Biliousness, Sick Headache, 
Torpid Liver, Furred Tongue, Indigestion, Constipation, Dizziness,
Sallow Skin") and in the following issue the testimony of Bishop L. H. 
Holsey that "Ministers of all Denominations Join in Recommending 
PE-RÜ—NA to the People" for protecting the throat and bronchial tubes 
to catarrhal infections.
Most coverage of the signing of the Federal Pure Food and Drug 
Act declared its passage as a victory for President Roosevelt, and 
fittingly so in view of his initiative and active support. But the 
Congress and the public recognized the work of Dr. Harvey Wiley and the 
law became known as the Wiley Act.
l^"Federal Power Exalted," New York Times. June 30, 1906,
p. 6.
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The Wiley Act ranged over a wide spectrum of problems in food
and drug manufacture, distribution, and sale. Particularly important at
the time were sections on adulteration and inspection. But for the
purposes of this paper the important legislation was contained
in Section V, Subchapter III:
That the introduction into any State, Territory, or the 
District of Columbia, or from any foreign country, or 
shipment to any foreign country of any article of 
food or drugs which is adulterated or misbranded, within 
the meaning of the Act (is hereby prohibited).14
The law granted the power of implementation and regulation to
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the
Secretary of Commerce and L a b o r . I t  further provided that.
The examination of foodstuffs and drugs shall be made 
in the Bureau of Chemistry of the Department of Agriculture, 
or under the direction and supervision of such Bureau, 
for the purpose of determining from such examinations 
whether such articles are adulterated or misbranded vfithin 
the meaning of this Act. . . .16
So although Wiley's Bureau of Chemistry was entrusted with the 
determination of adulteration and misbranding under the Act, the law 
did not grant the Bureau any enforcement power over deceitful pro­
motion. Furthermore, so-called patent or proprietary medicines had 
been specifically excluded. In his study. The Health of a Nation.
Oscar E. Anderson Jr. reports that on June 22, 1906, the Proprietary 
Association and other trade interests had managed to extract patent
^^Pure Food and Drug Act, 34 Stat. 768 (1906). 
ISlbid. at 768-9.
IGlbid. at 769.
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medicines from the scope of the law by persuading the Congress to narrow 
tlie definition of "drugs" to include only products recognized as
I 1 7medicines in the United States Pharmacopeia and the National Formulary.
IProprietary drugs were not so listed because, under the traditions of
property rights, the manufacturer held a patent to the preparation
which did not require him to disclose his manufacturing processes and
mixture preparation procedures. They were thus unlisted in the
Pharmacopeia and Formulary.
So Section 11(g) of the law as enacted provided that only those
drugs listed in the Pharmacopeia or Formulary were to be considered 
1 A"drugs." Furthermore, in cases of adulteration, proprietaries were
again excluded by Section 7, Article 1,
If, when a drug is sold under a name recognized in the United 
States Pharmacopeia or National Formulary, it differs from 
the standard of strength, or purity, as determined by the 
test laid down in the United States Pharmacopeia or 
National Formulary official at the time of investigation 
[it shall be deemed adulterated]. (Emphasis added.
And Section 7, Article 2, while encompassing most patent medicines, would
not declare them adulterated if the ingredients (though not necessarily
proportions) and strength were declared.
If its strength or purity fall below the professed standard 
or quality under which it is sold [it shall be deemed 
adulterated]!(Emphasis added.)20
^^Anderson, The Health of a Nation, pp. 190-4. 
IBpure Food and Drug Act, 34 Stat. 768.
19lbid. at 769.
ZOlbid. at 770.
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Thus, to a great extent, the law was meaningless. The term 
"misbranded" was to cause years of confusion and litigation. The 
federal authorities were thus left virtually powerless to regulate 
effectively consumer drugs, even those in interstate commerce. "During 
the entire era," Morton Mintz states in The Therapeutic Nightmare,
"the chief problem concerned non-prescription products. These had been 
the greatest m e n a c e . D r .  Wiley evidently felt this too when he 
alerted an ally. Representative James R. Mann of Illinois, saying that 
"the bill might as well not contain anything in regard to patent 
medicines
1
Few products advertised to the general public in 1906 were 
listed In the United States Pharmacopeia or the National Formulary. Very 
few medicines prescribed by physicians were even manufactured as 
finished products; most prescriptions were compounded by the pharmacists. 
Not until 1938 did further legislation begin effectively to control 
proprietary drug advertising.
Even after the passage of the Wiley Act, the realization of 
its limitations caused some public distress. While a leading magazine 
could say in May of 1908 that some patent medicines were being 
excluded from reputable periodicals,^^ many other popular magazines 
decried the ineffectiveness of the Wiley Act. World’s Work, commented 
that despite the Food and Drug Act, "there is at present no standard
Z^Mintz, The Therapeutic Nightmare, p. 50.
22Anderson, The Health of a Nation, p. 191.
^^"Victory for Decency," Outlook. May 23, 1908, p. 135,
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authority." Further, "this lets the public know that the article 
will not do any harm [which did not later prove true], but puts no 
limit on the exaggerated claims for it."24 The Independent complained 
that even medicines advertised direct to physicians in medical 
journals (often published by a manufacturer) were "worthless or 
fraudulent.
But the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 was not totally insig­
nificant. First, it was a piece of social legislation reflecting 
the conscience of the American people in the field of public health. 
Second, although regulation of interstate commerce in itself was not 
the primary intent, the Act did represent another major initiative 
by Congress to regulate such trade. Third, the law placed a definite 
responsibility on the federal government to investigate food and 
drugs. Fourth, it was a major victory for Teddy Roosevelt and a 
segment of the progressive g r o u p s . It did, however, prove totally 
ineffective in inhibiting false advertising. As Theodore Roosevelt 
later wrote,"the Pure Food Law represented a great step in the right 
direction . . .  no respectable magazine publishes [false advertising], 
but the great majority of the newspapers print it without limitation
A. Ayers, "Ifhat the Pure Food Law Saves Us From," World's 
Work. September, 1907, p. 9316.
B. Tingle, "Ethical Medicines," Independent. March 16,
1911, p. 561.
W. Dunn, "A Practicing Attorney Looks at the 1938 Federal 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and its Administration," in The Impact 
of the F.D.A. on Our Society, ed. by Henry Welch and Felix Marti-Ibanez,
p. 101.
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and probably gain as much money from it as from the financial 
advertisements.
I For the next five years. Dr. Wiley's program of reform was
hampered primarily by two circumstances. Of paramount importance was 
the imprecision of the language in the Pure Food and Drug law. The 
exact meaning of the Wiley Act regarding drugs was not clear to 
either government or business groups. Concurrently, within the 
Department of Agriculture itself Wiley encountered opposition led by 
the Department's Solicitor, George P. McCrab. Two—thirds of the 
prosecutions recommended by Wiley were blocked by the Board of Food
O Qand Drug Inspection of which McCrab was an influential member.
Solicitor McCrab also assumed control of the enforcement activities
of the Bureau of Chemistry by writing into the Department of
Agriculture's appropriation request for 1910 the extension of his
powers to encompass all legal activities of the Department. He then
prepared an order, approved by the Secretary, specifically assuming
the authority for the Bureau’s enforcement activities. So, while
neither had power over false advertising, the solicitor in the Department
of Agriculture, rather than the scientists of the Bureau of Chemistry,
29decided which products contained ingredients not permitted by law.
^^Theodore Roosevelt, "Applied Ethics in Journalism," Outlook, 
April 15, 1911, p. 115.
2&Turner, The Chemical Feast, p. 115.
29lbid., pp. 115-6.
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In late 1909, the vagueness of the Food and Drug Act with 
regard to "misbranding" and the proliferation of deceitful advertising 
prompted the Department of Agriculture to undertake an indictment for 
false advertising. The federal government alleged untrue advertising 
against the producers of a preparation known as Dr. Johnson's Mild 
Combination Treatment for Cancer.
The Federal District Court of Missouri declared that inter­
pretation of the Food and Drug Act must be "restrained to its 
expressed, reasonable intendment [or else the courts] may extend its 
operation far beyond the legislative intent," and refused to uphold the 
Federal Trade Commission's cease and desist order. The government 
eventually took the case to the Supreme Court.
The argument for the United States revolved primarily around
the intent of Congress and the public in demanding a pure food and
drug law, as reflected by "public agitation" and legislative history.
The Solicitor General pointed out that "the practice of patent—medicine
concerns to make extravagant cure-all claims was one of the principal
evils denounced in the public agitation contemporaneous with the
progress of the bill."^® The government's arguments concerning the
intention of Congress rested rather uneasily on what Congress did not
31do because they felt it unnecessary to be specific.
The defense presented three primary arguments as summarized 
by the court. First, on the question of the meaning of the term
30.̂ United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 490 (1911).
31lbid.
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"misbranded,” it was argued that the word is confined to representations
i
concerning the identity of the drug, its constituents, or chemical 
ingredients; it does not refer to claims for curative properties.
Second, with respect to the question of medical opinion, the Johnson 
Company contended that a claim for beneficial results is not a state­
ment of existing fact, but a forecast and is therefore an expression of 
opinion.Finally the defendant argued that the construction sought by 
the government (that the "misleading" statute extends to claims con­
cerning the curative powers of medicines or drugs) would render the 
statute void as beyond the power of the Congress to enact.
The Court's six-three decision for the defendant was rendered 
in the opinion read on May 29, 1911 by Associate Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes. He noted that the case revolved on the meaning of the word 
"misbranded" and fundamentally supported the defense.3^ It is a postulate, 
he said, that in a certain sense the statement on the Johnson label was 
false, or at least misleading. The necessary decision, he continued, 
should be whether such misleading statements are aimed at and hit by 
the words of the Act. The phrase "misleading" should not be construed, 
he felt, to be aimed not at all possible false statements, but 
only at those which determine the identity of the article, possibly
32ibid. at 489, 491. 
3^Ibid, at 494.
34%bid.
35Ibid.
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including strength, quality, and purity.Finally, to the heart of
the question. Justice Holmes said.
But such a statement as to contents, undescribed and unknown, 
is shown to be false only in its commendatory and prophetic 
aspect, and as such is not within the Act.^?
Justice Holmes also supported Johnson, though not as strongly,
on the question of medical opinion and the determination of medical
effects. The determination whether an article should be declared mis­
branded, he wrote, was left to the Bureau of Chemistry of the Department 
of Agriculture, which would be most natural if the question concerns 
ingredients and kind, but hardly so as to medical e f f e c t s . ^8
Finally, Holmes’ support of the defendant’s position on the
question of constitutionality was guarded, but, more important,
opened the door for further exploration of the question. Congress,
he pointed out, was much more likely to regulate commerce in food and
drugs with reference to plain matter of fact, so that food and drugs
should be what they professed to be, when the kind was stated, than to
distort its constitutional powers to establish criteria in regions
39where opinions are far apart.
Thus the Supreme Court ruled that advertising statements relate 
only to the identity of the product and not to its curative powers.
SGlbid. at 496. 
37lbld.
^^Ibid. at 497. 
S^Ibid. at 498.
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However, the dissenting justices— Hughes, Harlan, and Day— did perceive an 
injury to the la%^^^and their opinions would eventually advance more
I
^iberal construction.^^ Justice Hughes' dissenting opinion would, in 
fact, be cited in the following year as the basis for an amendment to 
the Wiley Act. He asserted that the ’court was ascribing "an altogether 
undue weight to the wording of the clause and [overlooking] the 
c o n t e x t . "42 jjg wrote further that "granted the wide domain of opinion, 
and allowing the broadest range to the conflict of medical views, there 
still remains a field in which statements as to curative powers are 
downright falsehoods and . . . not expressions of judgment. This 
field I believe this statute covers . . .  .”43
In 1912 Representative Swagar Sherley of Kentucky submitted an 
amendment to include false advertising in the prohibitions under the 
Wiley Act and used the dissenting opinion of Charles Evans Hughes in 
the Johnson case as the rationale for the a m e n d m e n t . 44
This effort to include untrue claims of efficacy under the 
meaning of "misbranded" was signed into law on August 23, 1912 and 
became known as the Sherley Amendment. However, during the hearings on 
the bill, Mr. Charles M. Woodruff of Parke, Davis and Company suggested
4Qlbid.
. 41ibid.
4 2 l b i d . at 502.
43lbid. at 504.
44U.S. Congress, House, 66th Cong., 2d sess., Aug. 19, 1912, 
Congressional Record. XLVIII, 11322, 11323.
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that the words "false and fradulent" be used in the law with regard 
to repugnant advertising.^^ The suggestion was accepted, and Section 8 
of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 was thus amended to define 
"misbranded" as
If its package or label shall bear or contain any statement, 
design, or device regarding the curative or therapeutic 
effect of such article or any of the ingredients or 
substances contained therein, which is false and fraudulent.
 ̂ [emphasis added]
But the words "and fradulent" enfeebled the amendment by placing upon
the government the exceedingly difficult task of proving fraudulent
intent. Primarily for this reason the law was, in practice, virtually
ineffective; and the six years of effort, 1906-1912, passed with only
theoretical control of ethical products and absolutely no regulation
of proprietary drug advertising, save for cases of clearly criminal
fraud.
^^Anderson, The Health of a Nation, p. 236.
4&U.S. Congress, House, 66th Cong., 2d sess., Aug. 19, 1912, 
Congressional Record. XLVIII, 11322, 11323.
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CHAPTER III 
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 
AND THE YEARS OF VACUUM
The formation of the Federal Trade Commission in 1914 was in 
no way derivative from the activities surrounding the Pure Food and 
Drug Act and the Sherley Amendment. "The genesis of the Federal Trade 
Commission stems directly from the economic history of the latter half 
of the nineteenth and the first decade of the twentieth centuries."^ 
The control of a specific business abuse— monopoly— was the reason for 
the formation of the Federal Trade Commission. The growth of 
monopoly since the end of the Civil War had first been effectively 
challenged by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, and it was from 
this measure that the formation of the Federal Trade Commission 
subsequently derived.
It was, in fact, more than seven years after the organization
of the Federal Trade Commission that a Supreme Court decision in the
2Winstead Hosiery case recognized the Commission to have limited 
jurisdiction over advertising.^ But drug advertising did eventually 
fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission,
^Morton J. Simon, The Law for Advertising and Marketing (New 
York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1956), p. 500.
^United States v. Winstead Hosiery, 272 F. 957 (1922).
^Simon, The Law for Advertising and Marketing, p. 500.
22
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. though at varying times and in varying degrees.
The Sherman Act of July 2, 1890 had never been as effective as 
envisioned by its drafters. The Act revolved around Section 3 
which prohibited "every contract, combination in form of trust or any 
conspiracy in restraint of t r a d e , B u t  serious difficulty had arisen 
in the categorization of just what constituted commerce and restraints 
of trade. In 1895, the Supreme Court had held that the American 
Sugar Refining Company— although it controlled 90 per cent of the 
sugar refining capacity of the country— was not restraining or 
monopolizing interstate commerce.^ Moreover, even if "commerce" could 
be adequately defined, which acts to be considered dangerous under the 
law could be disputable because virtually all contracts or agreements 
affect trade and commerce. Thus, in 1911, the Supreme Court decided 
in the Standard Oil^ and American Tobacco^ cases that "the Anti-Trust 
Act must be construed in the light of reason" and, as so construed,
"it prohibits all contracts and combination which amount to an
8unreasonable or undue restraint of trade in interstate commerce."
The Court further affirmed the "reasonable construction" dictum in
^Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 56 Stat. 209 (1890).
United States v. E. C. Knight Company, 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
^The Standard Oil Company of New Jersey et al. v. United 
States, 221 U.S. (1911).
^United States v. American Tobacco Company, 221 U.S. 106
(1911).
PThe Standard Oil Company of New Jersey et al. v. United 
States, 221 U.S. (1911).
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noting that all contracts directly or indirectly affect and possibly
Qrestrain commerce. So, although the Court had upheld the govern­
ment, it had also placed the very heavy burden of proving "unreasonable­
ness" upon the federal government and had rendered the Sherman Act 
useless against many forms of abuse.
Primarily because of what had proven to be such inadequacy in
the Sherman Act, Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission Act in
September, 1 9 1 4 . Section 5 of the Act carried its import.
That unfair methods of competition in commerce are hereby 
declared unlawful. The Commission is hereby empowered and 
directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, 
except banks, and common carriers subject to the Acts to 
regulate commerce, from using unfair methods of competition 
in commerce.12
A later House amendment (Section 5b) added a significant clause: 
"and if it shall appear to the commission that a proceeding by it in 
respect thereof would be of interest to the p u b l i c . T h i s  clause 
would later form the basis of liberal interpretation of the Act to 
include false advertising. While the legislative history and debate 
reveal definitely that Congress intended only to supplement and strengthen 
the Sherman Act and had no intention of regulating advertising as it 
affected consumers, the Federal Trade Commission would later attempt.
QUnited States v. American Tobacco Company, 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
^^Sirnon, The Law for Advertising and Marketing, p. 500.
^^Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914).
^^Ibid. at 719.
ISlbld.
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with some success, to assume this authority on the basis of the "public 
^nterest" phrase which had been inserted originally only "to prevent 
the Commission from becoming a clearing house to settle the every 
ay quarrels of competitors."^^ Thus the Federal Trade Commission was 
to be a "non-partisan, independent tribunal"^^ with the duty "to aid 
in enforcement of the Sherman Anti-Trust lâ /’̂^ and especially, in the 
words of Senator William S. Kenyon of Iowa, one which could "take hold 
of matters that are not in themselves sufficient to amount to a monopoly 
or to amount to restraint of trade.
That the sole purpose of Congress was to control monopoly 
through maintenance of competition was repeatedly stressed in debate, 
but false advertising was not a consideration. Debate between Senator 
Cummins and Senator Borah indicated that unfair competition consisted 
solely of "that violence of competition conducted through unfair 
practices and methods and which must ultimately result in the extinction
1 Qof the rival and the establishment of a monopoly." Senator Cummins 
later stated that to sustain competition "is the only justification
14y.S. Congress, House, 63d Cong., 2d sess., Sept. 10, 1914, 
Congressional Record. LI, 14930, 14936.
l^U.S. Congress, Senate, 63d Cong., 2d sess., June 27, 1914, 
Congressional Record. LI, 11235.
Congress, Senate, 63d Cong., 2d sess., June 13, 1914, 
Congressional Record. LI, 10376.
l^U.S. Congress, Senate, 63d Cong., 2d sess., August 3, 1914, 
Congressional Record. LI, 13156.
I Q  .U.S. Congress, Senate, 63d Cong., 2d sess., June 25, 1914, 
Congressional Record. LI, 11103.
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„19for the establishment of a trade commission.
Senator Joseph T. Robinson made the only reference to the 
question of advertising— though not to false advertising— in his state­
ment that unfair competition "may now be said to embrace every unjust, 
dishonest, and inequitable practice by which one seeks to unfairly 
destroy or injure the business of a c o m p e t i t o r . "^0 jjg was referring, 
however, to unfair competition as enjoined in United States versus 
American Thread C o m p a n y . T h i s  injunction prohibited attacking the 
credit or business reputation or quality of product dealt in by a 
competitor by means of any report known to be false and which further
prohibited "warning, harassing, threatening . . . by . . .  advertisements,
22any other person." This obviously was not a reference to spurious and 
deceitful claims for one's own product.
Further references were made to "competition on the part of one
Q o 2Aagainst the other" and to "stifling of competition," and to
19lbid. at 11104.
20U.S. Congress, Senate, 63d Cong., 2d sess., June 27, 1914, 
Congressional Record. LI, 11228.
Zllbld. at 11230.
United States v. American Thread Company, D.C.D.N.J. (1914). 
22U.S. Congress, Senate, 63d Cong., 2d sess., June 27, 1914, 
Congressional Record, LI, 11230.
23u.S. Congress, Senate, 63d Cong., 2d sess., June 25, 1914, 
Congressional Record. LI, 11112.
24U.S. Congress, Senate, 63d Cong., 2d sess., July 16, 1914, 
Congressional Record. LI, 12210.
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'jstopping monopoly at the t h r e s h o l d . "^5 Finally, Senator LeBaron B, 
dolt of Rhode Island foresaw and speculated on future judicial interpre­
tations of "unfair competition" and advised that "if Congress desires 
tL enlarge the meaning of unfair competition as known to the law, it 
should do so in express terms, so that the business community may know 
what is legal and what is illegal.
But the Congress declined to define precisely what "unfair 
competition" should embrace and the bill was signed by the President 
on September 26, 1914. There is no convincing evidence that the 
Federal Trade Commission Act was ever intended to protect the consumer, 
except indirectly through the maintenance of competition. This inter­
pretation was to come later, through administrative practice and case 
law.
In addition to the internal limitations of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, in October of 1914 the Congress reaffirmed its desire 
not to interfere substantially in business practices by passing the 
Clayton Anti-Trust Act. Fundamentally, this legislation interdicted 
some commercial practices, but only if their effect was to 
"substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. . . .
25U.S. Congress, House, 63d Cong., 2d sess.. Sept, 10, 1914, 
Congressional Record. LI, 14924.
2Gu.S. Congress, Senate, 63d Cong., 2d sess., Aug. 3, 1914, 
Congressional Record. LI, 13154.
^^Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
28Ibid. at 731.
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It should be noted here that during the legislative and 
judicial turmoil of the period 1911-1914— on the question of control 
over business— there had not been the widespread interest and partisan­
ship outside of the opposing interest groups that might have been 
expected. But during September and October of 1914, the passage 
within a month of two apparently far-reaching laws to regulate commerce 
brought forth a number of journalistic reactions— although the 
popular interest which carried so much weight for the Pure Food and 
Drug bill was absent.
On September 1, the New York Times entitled its lead editorial 
"Hothouse Commerce,"
The idea that capital works hardest when clubbed is still 
uppermost among the legislators. If capital refuses to invest 
under conditions which it has rejected for many years, why, 
then, is it necessary to make the terms of investment still
less attractive?29
The Washington Post argued against the Federal Trade Commission
Act and the Clayton Bill on September 22, describing them as striking
"deliberately at the heart of business" and "filled with pitfalls.
Again, on September 26, the Washington Post devoted its editorial space
to "Unnecessary Legislation,"
If there has been any public demand for the enactment of these 
measures the evidence of it is not apparent. There has been 
a strong and determined protest against the Clayton bill from 
harassed business men, but it is doubtful whether there have 
been any letters or telegrams advocating the bill.31
p. 6.
29"Hothouse Commerce," New York Times. September 1, 1914, p. 8 . 
^^"Biting Off Too Much," Washington Post. September 22, 1914, p. 6. 
^^"Unnecessary Legislation." Washington Post, September 26, 1914,
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On October 10, under the headline ’’Two-Faced Legislation," the
New York Times condemned the Federal Trade Commission bill as follows:
The clue through all this confusion seems to be that it is 
wrong to do by agreement, or by "conspiracy in restraint 
of trade." Yet all experience shows that law is the worst 
regulator of trade, apart from trade conduct.
It imposes trade standards which are not those of 
trade. . . .  It establishes a statutory morality and substi­
tutes it for the custom of good merchants and the findings^ 
of a jury of a business man's peers. It is this element 
which makes it disturbing to trade and enterprise.
The law starts without prestige and has a difficult way 
to make to the esteem of men upon whom the country's 
prosperity depends.32
As stated, there was apprehension, misapprehension, confusion, 
and ignorance about the legislation. It might be speculated that a 
combination of the textual weaknesses of the bills, the outbreak of 
World War I, and the feeling in some quarters that the Federal Trade 
Commission Act was simply an administrative adjustment created the 
atmosphere of general flux and uncertainty responsible for confusion.
Thus, although there was confusion about what the Federal Trade 
Commission Act and the Clayton Act did exactly mean, it was apparently 
generally accepted that neither covered any activities which were not 
directly injurious to competition and that false advertising per se 
was hot so covered. Therefore the Federal Trade Commission Act and the 
Clayton Act joined the Wiley Act and Sherley Amendment in ineffective­
ness as measures of consumer protection against deceitful and spurious 
advertising.
32'*xwo-Faced Legislation," New York Times. October 10, 1914,
p. 8 .
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The Federal Trade Commission assumed its functions in 1915, then, 
with the mandate to protect competition. But the Commission interpreted 
jits powers somewhat more broadly than had Congress and began to move 
against false advertising. The first test case was Sears Roebuck and 
Company versus Federal Trade Commission, and the decision was read on 
April 29, 1919.33 The Federal Trade Commission averred that the Sears 
Roebuck Company had practiced unfair methods of competition for two years 
by false and misleading advertisements and acts, designed to injure and 
discredit their corapetitors3^ and to deceive the general public.35 The 
Commission asked the court to command the petitioners to cease and 
desist from unfair methods of competition in commerce and also to "review” 
the powers of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.56
The decision of the court hinged primarily upon the constitutional 
question of the quasi-judicial status of the Federal Trade Commission, 
and, hence the validity of its orders. In this case, the court recog­
nized the powers of the Federal Trade Commission but did not recognize 
a direct injury to competition because the Federal Trade Commission had 
not proven that competition had in fact been injured. However, a 
dissenting opinion directed attention to the alleged false or unfair
35sears Roebuck and Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 P. 
307 (1919).
34ibid.
35statutes and Decisions Pertaining to the Federal Trade 
Commission, 1914-1929 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1935), pp. 36-43.
. 36lbid., p. 37.
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advertising. It noted that the Federal Trade Commission Act authorized 
the Commission to proceed when it had reason to believe that unfair 
methods of competition are or have been used and "if it shall appear 
to the Commission that a proceeding by it in respect thereof would 
be of interest to the p u b l i c . A l t h o u g h  the advertisement in 
question was too "stale" to deserve revival as a point in evidence, the 
dissenting opinion in the Sears Roebuck case was the first judicial 
notice of the public interest in respect of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act, without regard to the question of competition.
Ironically, as noted above, the phrase concerning the interest 
of the public was not inserted with any thought of false advertising 
or even other fraudulent practices. It was added solely because, in 
the words of Representative J. H, Covington of Maryland, the provision 
"prevents the Commission from becoming a clearing house to settle the 
everyday quarrels of competitors, free from detriment to the public, 
which should be adjusted through the ordinary processes of the c o u r t s . "^8 
But, in spite of the obvious intentions of Congress, the question of 
the domain of the public interest had at least been recognized in a 
federal court as worthy of argument. The Federal Trade Commission took 
from this a cue for future litigation.
However, from the Federal Trade Commission's viewpoint, this 
was still only a minor glimmer of light for its position. Generally,
37gears Roebuck and Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 F. 
313, 314 (1919).
^^.S. Congress, House, 63d Cong., 2d sess., Sept. 10, 1914, 
Congressional Record. LI, 14930.
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the courts were not anxious to support a quasi-judicial federal agency 
against private enterprise. The attitude of the courts is amply demon­
strated in the decision in Federal Trade Commission versus Gratz, also in 
1919.39 In this remarkable opinion, the court declared that the words 
"unfair methods of competition," as used in the Act, " . . .  are clearly 
inapplicable to practices never heretofore regarded as opposed to good 
morals because characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud, or 
oppression, or as against public policy because of their dangerous 
tendency unduly to hinder competition or create m o n o p o l y . "^0
Further evidence of the conservative stance of the courts 
appeared in 1920 in Federal Trade Commission versus Beech-Nut Company.
In a question of maintenance of resale prices, the Supreme Court found 
that "such a method of preventing competition . . . between purchasers 
constituted merely the exercise of a man's right to do what he will 
with his own," and was not in violation of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act.
The inevitable question of the constitutionality of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act was settled, also in 1920, in the case of the 
National Harness Manufacturer’s Association versus Federal Trade 
C o m m i s s i o n . 42 The Manufacturer’s Association contended that it was
(1920).
39j*ederal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 258 F.314 (1919). 
^Opederal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 30 A.L.R. 1134 (1919). 
41pederal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Company, 42 S.Ct. 150
42uational Harness Manufacturers Association v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 268 F.705 (1920).
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contrary to Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Constitution to confer legis­
lative, executive, and judicial powers and functions on an administrative 
body such as the Federal Trade Commission. The Court found, however, 
that Congress did have the power to authorize an administrative body to 
determine questions of fact as to what methods of competition any trader 
used, and to decide provisionally whether such methods were unfair in 
terms of law and fact. The Court held the Commission’s authority to be 
a valid executive and administrative one and, since by the terms of the 
Act creating it no order of the Federal Trade Commission could be 
enforced without obtaining an order from the Circuit Court of Appeals, 
no judicial powers had in fact been delegated to the Commission.
In September of 1921, the original intent of Congress, i.e. the 
protection of competition, was reaffirmed in Kinney-Rome versus Federal 
Trade Commission when the court expressed the opinion that there must 
be some fraud in trade that demonstrably injures a competitor or 
lessens competition before it can be said that there has been an 
unfair method of competition.^4
What appeared to be a far-reaching breakthrough for regulation 
of false advertising came in 1922 in Federal Trade Commission versus 
Winstead H o s i e r y . 45 %n this case, concerning the mislabeling of 
clothing products as ’’Australian Wool” and "Natural Wool,” the Supreme
4^National Harness Manufacturers Association v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 18 A.L.R.549 (1920).
4^Kinney-Rome v. Federal Trade Commission, 273 F.665 (1921).
45pederal Trade Commission \V. Winstead Hosiery, 42 S.Ct. 384
(1922).
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Court reversed a lower court in holding for the Federal Trade Commission.
I The Court held that "the labels in question are literally false. . . ."
I
jAll the labels were, as the Commission determined," calculated to 
deceive and do in fact deceive, a substantial portion of the purchasing 
public— the facts show that it is in the interest of the public that a 
proceeding to stop the practice be b r o u g h t . T h e  Court did point out 
that such deceitful advertising also injures competitors because trade 
was diverted from the producer of truthfully marked goods.
So the Court had officially adopted the minority view of the 
domain of "public interest" expounded in the Sears Roebuck case of 
1919, i.e. that there is in fact a public interest in existence which 
is concerned with the welfare of the general populace apart from 
questions of competition. The idea that "the public had an interest in 
stopping the practice as wrongful" became a point of case law.^®
In a later important case considered below (L. B. Silver 
Company versus Federal Trade Commission, 289 F.985) it was determined 
that the Winstead Hosiery decision actually involved "mere palming off" 
and was like any other misdescription or misbranding. Thus it was not a 
flat necessarily to apply the "public interest" concept to a d v e r t i s i n g . 4 9
4&Statutes and Decisions Pertaining to the Federal Trade 
Commission. 1914-1929. p. 201.
47pederal Trade Commission v. Winstead Hosiery, 30 A.L.R.1135
(1922).
4%tatutes and Decisions Pertaining to the Federal Trade
Commission. 1914-1929, p. 202..
. Silver Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 289 F.985,
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But the precedent had been made and was to be used in numerous later 
cases. If nothing else, it would become valuable as an articulation 
of the concept of public interest.
The Royal Baking Powder case, also in 1922, was clearly a
situation of mere "palming off" a product as another and the Winstead
Hosiery decision was applied. But perhaps the significance in the
decision against the Royal Baking Powder Company was the apparent change
in attitude toward unfettered private business displayed by the court.
The decision included this stern warning:
The purpose of the Congress in creating the FTC was 
aimed at just such dishonest practices, and business concerns 
that resort to dishonest devices of this nature must 
understand that they cannot add to their revenue or main­
tain their business standing by methods of competition which 
the law brands as "unfair" and therefore unlawful.50
The Federal Trade Commission, now apparently encouraged by the 
minority recognition of "public interest" in the Sears Roebuck case and 
by the Winstead Hosiery and Royal Baking Powder decisions, attempted 
to apply these precedents to the L. B. Silver Company, a producer of 
deceitful advertising of hogs for sale. But the Circuit Court of Appeals 
struck down the Commission's argument primarily because the general 
public was not affected. Judge Denison accused the Federal Trade 
Commission of wasting the federal courts' time and wrote scathingly 
that the
5®Royal Baking Powder Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 
281 F.753 (1922).
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. . .  commission has adopted the theory that the "unfair 
fmethods of competition" denounced by Section 5 [of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act] include all false [and] 
unethical advertising and promotion . . .  by which . . . 
the public . . . may be, in a substantial way, misled.
The vista of business censorship seen through such an 
opening is limitless.
The opinion further stated that the jurisdiction of the 
Commission was limited to situations indicating at least a substantial 
appearance of restraint of trade or m o n o p o l y . T h e  Federal Trade 
Commission, possibly realizing the basic weakness of the case as a test 
involving "public interest" did not appeal to the Supreme Court and, 
following this decision in February, 1923, did not press a significant 
false advertising case until 1929.
At that time Justice Louis Brandeis in Federal Trade Commission 
versus Klesner noted that action by the Federal Trade Commission under 
the "public interest" clause could not be satisfied merely by proof 
that there had been misapprehension and confusion among purchasers or 
even that they had been deceived— unless fraud was clearly i n v o l v e d . ^3 
But he left a possible opening for future Federal Trade Commission 
action "in the public interest" by suggesting that there may be cases 
in which the real loss to each individual due to confusion might be too 
small to warrant a private suit, with or without the involvement of 
fraud, although the aggregate of the loss might be so serious and
(1923).
B. Silver Company v. Federal Trade Commission, 289 F.992 
S^ibld. at 993.
^^Federal Trade Commission v^ Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929).
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widespread as to make the matter one of public interest.
The frequently vague and contradictory judicial opinions on 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act had hampered, if not 
actually thwarted, the administrative interpretation of the Act.
A final, definitive judgment of the legal validity of the concept of 
"public interest" without regard to competitive injury became 
necessary. To force this decision, the Federal Trade Commission filed 
suit asking that the Raladam Company, manufacturer of the obesity 
remedy Marmola. be ordered to cease advertising the preparation with 
statements allegedly false and m i s l e a d i n g . ^5
The Commission's order reduced to two prohibitions. First, it 
proscribed the representation that Marmola was a scientific remedy for 
obesity. Second, the Commission forbade advertising the drug as a 
remedy for obesity unless the promotional material and literature 
bear the statement that the medicine is not safe unless taken under 
the supervision of a competent physician. On the other hand, the 
Raladam Company alleged that the Commission's findings were not 
supported by evidence and that it lacked jurisdiction.^^
The Court first dismissed the question of fraud on the part of 
Raladam because the safety of the drug could be a matter of professional 
opinion. It also dismissed the respondent's contention that the Federal
54ibid. at 28.
^^Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam Company, 283 U.S. 643 
(1930). • '
5&Ibid.
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Trade Commission injunction was a violation of the First Amendment to 
the Constitution.57
Associate Justice George Sutherland read the decision in favor 
of Raladam. However, he accepted several of the Commission's arguments. 
He concurred that probably the advertising methods were indeed unfair 
and noted that "if the necessity of protecting the public against 
dangerously misleading advertisements of a remedy sold in interstate 
commerce were all that necessary to give the Commission jurisdiction, the
CO[cease and desist] order could not be successfully assailed." He 
also agreed that "elimination [of the advertising in question] would tend 
to the public good"^^ and that prevention of such methods would be in 
the interest of the p u b l i c . B u t  the court found that the third 
requisite, that the unfair methods of advertising are methods of 
competition in commerce, was not p r o v e n . Justice Sutherland said 
that the action forbidden by the statute was "unfair competition," 
and that nothing can be unfair where there is no significant competition. 
He continued :
62
It is apparent . . . that the Commission does not take this 
limited view of its jurisdiction, but that it believes itself 
authorized to issue its "cease and desist" orders in any
57ibid. at 646. 
58ibid.
59lbid. 
GOlbld.
Ĝ Ibid.
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case where it concludes that sales methods may mislead a 
substantial part of the purchasing public, in a way and 
to an extent that, in the judgment of the Commission, 
is injurious to the purchaser. The general law of unfair 
competition uses the misleading of the ultimate retail 
purchaser as evidence of the primary vital fact, injury 
to the lawful dealer; the Commission uses this ultimate, 
presumed injury to the final user as itself the vital 
fact.63
And this had in fact been the philosophy of the Federal Trade Commission 
in its movement against false and spurious advertising— the protection 
of the consumer as a worthy goal of "public interest" in itself. But 
the Raladam decision ended the Federal Trade Commission's efforts to 
enjoin the dissemination of false advertising under the existing 
laws. The Commission did not undertake major litigation against abuses 
in this field until it had helped to secure more powerful legislation 
in 1938. The regulation of non-label drug advertising at this point 
was virtually nonexistent, but advertising abuses were not.
"There is no federal legal limit to the false and misleading 
statements which may appear in newspapers, magazines, almanacs, 
dodgers, and billboards," reported the New Republic in 1927. "As 
patent medicines are bought primarily by virtue of non-package 
advertising, the [label] protection is thus more nominal than real."^^ 
The authors pointed to dozens of the worst abuses. La-Mar Reducing 
Soap was termed "unadulterated hokum" by Dr. Arthur J. Cramp, Director 
of the Bureau of Investigation of the American Medical Association.
Jess Willard's victory over Jack Johnson was attributed to Nuxated Iron:
Ĝ Ibid.
mers in Wonderland: Quacks and Vendors of Cure-alls,'
aart Chase and F. J. Schlink, February 16, 1927, pp.
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three years later Jack Dempsey credited Nuxated Iron for his win^over 
Willard. Mailing lists of persons afflicted with specific diseases 
were offered for sale.^^ Many of the non-label false advertising 
abuses had been untouched by the legislation which might have been 
valuable in controlling it.
During the period that the Federal Trade Commission had 
attempted to establish its authority over proprietary advertising, the 
Bureau of Chemistry in the Department of Agriculture had not been 
active in control of drug "labeling." Its inactivity resulted primarily 
from having been saddled with the burden of proving fraud by the 
Sherley Amendment and having been forced to cede some authority to 
Solicitor McCrab. Furthermore, the Bureau had been without the 
guidance of Dr. Harvey Wiley. In 1911, Dr. Wiley had hired a colleague. 
Dr. Henry H. Rusby, for consultancy at a fee of $1,600.^6 Solicitor 
McCrab and Frederick L. Dunlap, both of whom served with Wiley on the 
Board of Food and Drug Inspection, instigated an investigation and 
Wiley was charged with the misuse of government funds. He was 
exonerated by a Congressional Commission but resigned in March.of 1912.
Mr. Roscoe Doolittle, a long-time subordinate, succeeded Wiley 
as head of the Bureau. But, perhaps lacking Dr. Wiley's aggressiveness.
G^ibid.
^^Anderson, The Health of a Nation, pp. 244—5. 
^^Turner, The Chemical Feast, pp. 116-7.
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the Bureau did little to control mislabeling and misbranding. The 
Federal Trade Commission, on the other hand, had limited experience 
in ethical medicines and limited funds, in addition to its juris­
dictional difficulties in the courts. There is no evidence that it 
made any effort to assume^; authority by default over the promotion 
or packaging of ethicals.
In 1927, the Bureau of Chemistry was reorganized and renamed the 
Food, Drug, and Insecticide Administration. The agency remained in the 
Department of Agriculture with regulation of ethical drugs to be a 
major function. In terms of statutory authority, however, the new 
Food, Drug and Insecticide Administration was in no better regulatory 
position than Wiley's Bureau of Chemistry had been in 1912. Control 
over advertising of ethical preparations still operated under the 
"false and fradulent" clause of the Sherley Amendment. It was not until 
1938 that new legislation provided more comprehensive authority.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER IV 
THE PERIOD OF DIVISION;
THE WHEELER-LEA AND COPELAND ACTS 
1933-1948
J
The Great Depression brought a growing awareness of all social 
responsibilities and, as a by-product, a resurrection of interest in the 
control of consumer advertising. Several members of Congress, notably 
Senators Burton K. Wheeler and Royal S. Copeland and Representative
C. F. Lea, advanced plans for new legislation in the regulation of 
food and drug products. But solutions to more pressing social problems 
were, in planning and development stages and took precedence over major 
efforts at the control of advertising.
But in 1937 a national tragedy ensured the speedy passage of 
corrective legislation. The Massengill Company of Tennessee marketed a 
brand of sulfa-family drug, trademarked "Elixir of Sulphanilamide."
The preparation had been compounded with a toxic solvent, though simple 
animal testing would have exposed the poisonous solvent, and at least 
108 Americans died within a few weeks. Under existing law there was no 
basis for the Food, Drug and Insecticide Administration even to seize 
the product. However, the federal government was finally able to seize 
the drug— but only on the basis that the word "Elixir" in the trade
^Ernest Q. King, "New Drugs" in Welch and Marti-Ibanez, The 
Impact of the F.D.A. on Our Society, pp. 30-1.
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name implied the presence of alcohol while there was in fact, none;
2hence the medicine was misbranded. Had the product been trademarked
a "Solution,** the regulatory authorities would have been powerless.
Public realization of the impotence of the government in
controlling the activities of pharmaceutical manufacturers brought
demands for immediate legislation._ Although the contamination of an
ethical product, sulphanilamide, was for the most part responsible for
the agitation for reform, a movement for regulation of proprietary
medicine and its advertising also arose from the incident.
As late as May, 1933, reputable magazines advertised such
products as Lashlure. an eye make-up which caused at least one case
4of permanent blindness; thallium acetate, sold as Koremlu. was 
advertised as a depilatory (today it is considered too dangerous
even for public sale as rat poison);^ the control of pneumonia and
£tuberculosis was the platform of the Listerine campaign.
While there was considerable pressure within the government and 
from the citizenry for the creation of truly effective controls, 
there was divisive and ineffactuating conflict over which agency of the
^Charles 0. Jackson, Food and Drug Legislation in the New Deal 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), Chap. VII.
^Charles Wesley Dunn, The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
(New York: G.E. Stechert Company, 1938), p. ix.
^Ruth deForest Lamb, The American Chamber of Horrors (New York: 
Farrar and Rinehart, 1936), pp. 15-23.
^Kallet and Schlink, 100.000,000 Guinea Pigs, p. 80.
^Lamb, The American Chamber of Horrors, p. 309.
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goverruaent would exercise control. Some legislators argued for an 
autonomous Food and Drug Administration, independent of inter-department 
conflicts and theoretically less prone to influence; other legislators 
favored a stronger Federal Trade Commission; still others sought control 
by the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce and 
Labor, or the Department of the Treasury.
After some agitation, the forces in favor of a new federal 
agency appeared to be dominant and increased support developed for 
passage of Senator Royal Copeland's Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
bill, with broad power given to a Food and Drug Administration. 
Simultaneously, however, a plan to strengthen the Federal Trade Commission 
was being developed by the Federal Trade Commission's supporters, led 
by Senator Burton K. Wheeler.
In March of 1938, the supporters of the bill strengthening the 
Federal Trade Commission managed not only to secure passage of the bill 
(the Wheeler—Lea Act) but also succeeded in inserting a provision granting 
control of advertising of "food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices" to the 
Trade Commission. "Labeling" was specifically excluded.
Three months later, in June, 1938, the Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act passed. The Food and Drug Administration acquired control only of 
drug "labeling," which had been excluded from the Wheeler-Lea Act.
Although definitions of "advertising" and "labeling" were not clear, the 
Food and Drug Administration did assume jurisdiction not only of the 
printed matter on the label of the container but also control over 
explanations, instructions, and other material "accompanying" the
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{produce. Both proprietary and ethical materials In this category fell 
lunder FDA control.
The federal government had split its forces. The Federal Trade 
Commission, assuming responsibility for the regulation of "advertising" 
for ethical products, simultaneously relinquished to the Food and Drug 
Administration the control of "labeling." Thus, the Food and Drug 
Administration controlled labeling (ethical and proprietary), and the 
Federal Trade Commission was to regulate advertising. Later court 
decisions (discussed below) left this jurisdictional compromise 
in shambles by declaring certain promotional material to be both labeling 
and advertising, thus ensuring that the task of effective regulation was 
virtually impossible in administrative practice.
The point has been made here that both the Pure Food and Drug 
Act of 1906, as amended, and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 
had not possessed the precision and authority necessary to implement the 
regulatory function that many felt to be required. The words of the laws 
did serve to indicate strong moral reprobation toward unfair and devious 
practices, but the activities to which the statutes were applicable were 
difficult to identify. Furthermore, between 1906 and the early 1930's, 
advertising had grown staggeringly; the radio was a major medium of 
communication; the circulation of popular periodicals, especially women's 
magazines, had multiplied a number of times.^ The increasingly 
sophisticated techniques of advertising were applied virtually without 
control.
7Toulmin, A Treatise on the Law of Food, Drugs, and 
Cosmetics, p. 818.
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The development of rules and precedents had been left to the 
process of interpretation and decision of controversies by adminis­
trative and judicial tribunals, and their erratic judgments had not 
satisfactorily defined the law. The Food and Drug Administration, on 
the one hand, did virtually nothing to regulate drug promotion; on the 
other, the Federal Trade Commission’s authority in advertising had been 
mauled by the Raladam decision. Furthermore,’ the courts, assuming 
whatever quasi-judicial role Congress intended them to possess, were 
required, as a result, to decide business and economic questions
oas well.
Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana had become involved in the
problems of trade practice regulation and the Federal Trade Commission
in 1930 and on January 14, 1935, submitted an amendment to the Federal
Trade Commission Act. The bill. Senate 944, stipulated that (1) "unfair
methods of competition" be broadened to include unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in interstate commerce, and (2) that the FTC be granted
power over unfair methods, acts, and practices in Interstate commerce,
whether or not the offender was engaged in commerce (thus allowing
a financially disinterested consumer to suffer recognizable injury)
9or the acts were even done in the course of commerce. But it was felt 
by some, notably by Senator Warren Austin of Vermont, that the Act
®Gerald C. Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission: A Study in
Administrative Law and Procedure (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1924), Chap. 1.
^Charles Wesley Dunn, The Wheeler-Lea Act (New York: G.E.
Stechert Company, 1938), p. 34.
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10would reach intrastate commerce, and the bill died on the calendar.
The Wheeler bill, however, received considerable support. The
American Mercury noted the need for coverage of cosmetics as provided in 
1T_the bill. Even President Roosevelt mentioned in a message to 
Congress on March 22, 1935 that a measure was needed which would 
"extend the controls formerly applicable only to labels to advertising
also."12 j
Senator Wheeler again introduced his amendment- to the FTC Act 
in 1936 in response to a request for the amendment by the Federal Trade 
Commission. The Commission felt that it needed clear jurisdiction over 
a practice which "may be unfair or deceptive to the public but not 
necessarily unfair to a competitor."!^ The bill passed the Senate 
but died in the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
after debate exposed some fears of extension of the Commission's power 
to legislative and judicial a r e a s . T h r e e  companion bills were 
introduced in the House in the 74th and 75th Congresses, but all died 
in committee.
lOlbid.
l^"Patent Medicines and the Law," American Mercury. November, 
1933, p. 274.
^^U.S. Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., 1st sess., March 22, 1945, 
Congressional Record. LXXIX, 4262.
^^Dunn, The Wheeler-Lea Act, p. 197.
l^U.S. Congress, House, 74th Cong., 2d sess.. May 4, 1936, 
Congressional Record. LXXX, 6658.
U.S. Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., 2d sess.. May 4, 1936, 
Congressional Record. LXXX, 6590, 6601, 6603.
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Senator Copeland's bill was reintroduced on January 22, 1937 
and, with minor alteration, it passed the Senate on March 29, 1937.
The bill met opposition in the House, however, where there was feeling 
that it would be an ineffactuating division of responsibility and 
would "cripple the efficiency and power of the Food and Drug 
Administration."^^ Although the House Committee reported favorably, 
the Minority Report (Representatives Virgil Chapman, Edward Kenny, and 
Carl Mapes) asserted that the competence and authority of the FDA was 
greater in some areas and as a "police measure" the Food and Drug Act 
was vastly superior to the Trade Commission Act.^^
By now the contest between the supporters of the FDA and those 
of the FTC was apparent in public statements. Representative Mapes 
said.
Whether the Federal Trade Commission shall have jurisdiction 
over the advertising of food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices, 
or whether the Pure Food and Drug Administration in the 
Department of Agriculture shall be given such jurisdiction.
This is the real issue involved in the bill under consideration 
. , . some of us believe it would be unfortunate to put this 
power in the hands of [the FTC] instead of [the PFDA] in 
the Department of Agriculture.^^
Representative Coffee of Washington spoke of his objections to the
Wheeler-Lea bill based on the preference of the patent medicine
manufacturers for it and presented a letter to fellow
s. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 3d sess., Jan. 12, 1938, 
Congressional Record. LXXXIII, 393.
^^Dunn, The Wheeler-Lea Act, p. 197.
^^U.S. Congress, House, 75th Cong., 3d sess., Jan, 12, 1938, 
Congressional Record. LXXXIII, 393.
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manufacturers from W. K. Burgess, president of the Knox Company, which
I -If, *manufactured a patent medicine called Cystex. * Burgess predicted
Îhat advertising would decrease 60 to 90 per cent if the Food and Drugdministration received power over advertising. He insisted that they
would demand advertising be in the same terras as information supplied
on the label while the FTC, understanding that advertising was
necessary for profit, would not interfere with "those kinds of
19advertisements that will sell merchandise."
Business in general supported the patent medicine manufacturers,
though on more philosophical grounds. Business Week reported that
"this bill [the Wheeler bill] is frankly an advance on a new front
in the struggle to bring business more firmly under government 
20’guidance.’" Another journal called for a letter-writing campaign 
in support of the Copeland bill. It was stated that the Wheeler bill 
was anti-NRA, would seriously affect employment in the affected
21industries, put thousands out of work, and close plants and stores.
The supporters of FTC control of advertising also presented 
a strong case. It rested upon the fact that the Commission had some 
experience in litigation against false advertising and had the machinery
IGlbid. at 419.
19lbid. at 420.
^^"Advertising or Tugwell; Bill for the Revision of the Food 
and Drugs Act," Business Week. October 28, 1933, pp. 13-14.
21"Copeland Bill," Journal of Home Economics. March, 1934,
p. 171.
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and trained personnel to Investigate in all industries and all 
commodities. They further argued that public protection should be 
harmonized and unified under one organization with consistent and 
standard methods of enforcement and penalization. They claimed that 
vesting the FTC with control over all advertising would result in 
efficiency, uniformity, and e c o n o m y . ^2
The House passed the bill in January, 1938 and it was returned to 
the Senate for ratification of amendments. Here Senators Wheeler and 
Copeland, the latter a champion of a strong Food and Drug Administration, 
met in a final contest. Copeland demanded assurance that the Wheeler bill 
had nothing to do with the functions of the Food and Drug Administration. 
Wheeler insisted that the two agencies would be separate and act 
concurrently, although he admitted the possibility that there might be 
jurisdictional conflict "to some slight extent." Copeland was not 
assured, but Congress passed the Wheeler bill on March 14, 1938.^3
Sections 5 and 12 contained the amendments to the Federal Trade 
Commission Act which directly affected drug advertising. Section 5 was 
altered to include deception in competition.^^ Section 12 struck 
directly at false advertising by any means likely to induce the 
purchase of food, drugs, devices, or cosmetics. Such advertising was
29Dunn, The Wheeler-Lea Act, p. 169.
23U.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 3d sess., Jan. 13, 1938, 
Congressional Record. LXXXIII, 446, 447.
^^Toulmin, A Treatise on the Law of Food. Drugs and Cosmetics.
p. 1323.
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to be considered an unfair or deceptive act within the meaning of the
amended Section 5.^^
However, in spite of the sweeping powers this gave to the FTC
actually to make judgments about the intangibles of advertising, the
amended Act neutralized these powers to some extent by limitations on
the two methods of enforcement, preliminary injunctions and FTC orders.
Orders to cease false advertising became, under the Wheeler-Lea Act,
final and enforceable sixty days after service on the advertiser
unless he seeks a court review. D u r i n g  a period of court review, an
advertiser is under no legal compulsion to cease the promotion practice
(unless the Commission can demonstrate possible injury to health—
discussed below), and the judicial process moves slowly. An example
of the effects of this provision may be the FTC order against "Carter's
Little Liver Pills," which was finally enforced sixteen years after 
27it was served.
The FTC received also the power and right to obtain a 
preliminary injunction against false advertising— requiring the adver­
tiser to stop the advertising practice in question pending the judgment
of a court review— if the Commission can demonstrate that the continued
28use of the advertising may be injurious to health. The Wheeler-Lea
Z^Ibid.. 1235.
ZGlbid.. pp. 1232-34.
^^Ralph Lee Smith, The Health Hucksters (New York: Thomas Y.
Cromwell, 1960), p. 208.
28simon, The Law of Advertising and Marketing, p. 506.
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Act, then, was a strong declaration of outrage and intent but something 
less than strong, practically and legally sound correction of abuse.
In early 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt commissioned Senator 
Royal S. Copeland of New York, a medical doctor, to plan and guide 
through the Congress a new program for control of all aspects of the 
manufacture, preparation, and sale of food, medicines, and cosmetics.
<r
Senator Copeland introduced his bill on June 12, 1933. Because of
active support for the legislation by Rexford G. Tugwell, the new
Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, it was known as the "Tugwell Bill."
As opposed to earlier imprecise legislation, the Tugwell Bill
was very specific in its intentions, A major clause read, in part:
an advertisement of a food, drug, or cosmetic shall be deemed 
false if in any particular it is untrue, or by ambiguity 
or inference creates a misleading impression regarding such 
food, drug or cosmetic.
Another section provided that a drug would be considered misbranded,
if its labeling bears any representation, directly or 
by ambiguity or inference, concerning the effect of such 
drug which is contrary to the general agreement of 
medical opinion.^0
But a major thrust of the bill appeared in Section 8 (f) which
asserted that drugs not recognized in the United States Pharmacopeia or
the National Formulary must also meet the standards under which they are
29Mintz, The Therapeutic Nightmare, p. 46- 
SOlbid.
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sold.^ Understandably, the entire bill, and obviously this clause 
aimed at proprietary advertising, met bitter opposition, primarily from 
the proprietary medicine industry and the advertising industry. Amid 
industry's clamor about the right of self-medication and the First 
Amendment, the United (patent) Medicine Manufacturers of America 
quickly launched a seventeen-point attack bn the bill in its own 
industry as well as among advertising and publishing groups.
The power of the opposition to legislation was strong. The 
bill encountered in Congress what Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson 
called a "conspiracy of silence," during which the measure was diluted 
while being b l o c k e d . ^3 The Tugwell Bill of 1933 died in Committee 
in the Senate. A successor to the Tugwell Bill, introduced by 
Copeland in the Second Session of the same Congress (73d) on January 4, 
1934 also died in Committee.
However, in 1933, a book by Arthur Kallet and F, J, Schlink, 
100.000,000 Guinea Pigs (Grosset and Dunlap, New York, 1933), which 
dealt primarily with abuses in the food industry went through twenty- 
seven printings and fanned public indignation.^^ Also at this time, the 
Department of Agriculture prepared a public display of fraudulent.
^^Dunn, The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, p. 33. 
^^Mintz, The Therapeutic Nightnare.. p. 45.
33ibid.
3^Dunn, The Federal Food, Pru3. and Cosmetic Act, pp. 51-67. 
33xurner, The Chemical Feast, p. 127.
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harmful, and misleading food, drug, and cosmetic products and their 
advertisements, examples of which were given in Chapter I, But even 
the public response generated by the book and the display were not 
sufficient to overcome the medicine, advertising, and publishing 
industries' opposition to reform.
In February, 1934, Senator Copeland introduced a new bill 
(Senate 2800) which was substantially identical to the two previous 
attempts, except, among other changes, that it relieved publishers of 
responsibility for false advertising. It died on the Senate Calendar. 
Senator Copeland again introduced the food and drug bill, amid increasing 
interest in the Congress and in the country, on January 4, 1935. The 
bill was again substantially the same as Copeland's previous proposals.
It passed to the Senate Committee on Commerce and emerged with the 
committee's approval. The minority opinion of the committee, however, 
argued that the Federal Trade Commission should control advertising.3?
This constituted a preview of the battle in Congress between the
;
supporters of the FDA and those in favor of FTC control.
There continued strong opposition to the Copeland measure in 
the Senate and a strong effort, led by Bennett C. Clark of Missouri 
and Josiah William Bailey of North Carolina, developed to recommit the
3&U.S. Congress, Senate, 73d Cong., 2d sess., Feb. 19, 1934, 
Congressional Record, LXXVIII, 2728, 2729.
^^U.S. Congress, Senate, Minority Report of the Senate 
Committee on Commerce. Report 361, Part 2, 74th Cong., 1st sess., 1935, 
pp. 389-400.
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b|Lll to committee, where it had twice previously died.^8 Furthermore,
I
debate revealed serious misgivings about granting Department of 
Agriculture officials the power of arbitrary action over advertising,^® 
But the Senate felt the pressure of growing public sentiment for 
regulation, and some members had come to resent the pressures of 
industrial organizations and concerns. Senator William King of 
Utah provided an insight to the position of drug manufacturers when 
he read a telegram from a Utah drug concern, McKesson Ogden Wholesale 
Company :
We urge your opposition to the so-called "Copeland food and 
drug bill," particularly portions requiring formula dis­
closures as destroying in many cases property rights built 
up over many years; also removal of advertising control 
from FTC, where effective procedure has been built up 
through long experience . . .  .^0
Senator Copeland assured the members that there was no intent to require
formula disclosure, simply a listing, without quantities, of the .
active ingredients.
The bill was passed by the Senate on May 31, 1935 and sent to
the House of Representatives, where strong opposition again arose. The
opposition centered around the problem of jurisdiction, as it had in
the Senate. Representative Edward Kenny (N.J.) asked, "do we want this
^®Dunn, The Federal Food. Drug, and Cosmetic Act, pp. 450-76. 
3®Ibid.. pp. 424-38.
^^U.S. Congress, Senate, 74th Cong., 1st sess., April 4, 1935, 
Congressional Record. LXXIX, 5018.
41lbid.
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administration [the FDA] to be prosecutor, judge, jury\ and execu­
tioner?"^^ And B, C. Reece of Tennessee asserted.
If you want to place the advertising under Dr. Tugwell 
(Assistant Secretary of Agriculture) and give him a 
whip lash not only over business, but over the press 
of this country, vote for the motion made, but if you 
want to give it to the Federal Trade Commission, a 
quasi-judicial body, vote against it.43
A House-Senate Conference Committee could not reach agreement, 
specifically on the question of whether the FTC or the FDA would control 
advertising. The House conferees maintained their insistence on control 
by the FTC and finally Senator Copeland proposed a compromise amend­
ment giving control of health advertisements to the Food and Drug 
Administration and control over all other advertising*to the FTC.^^
But the House rejected the amendment by a vote of 190-70, and the bill 
died in the House.
On January 6, 1937, during the first session of the 75th 
Congress, Senator Morris Sheppard of Texas re-introduced the Copeland 
Bill (as it was now universally known) in Senator Copeland’s stead.
The heart of the bill had always been the provisions against false 
advertising, but the Wheeler-Lea Act had assumed this control and had 
been passed and signed three months before. So the authority of the FDA
S. Congress, House, 74th Cong., 2d sess., June 20, 1936, 
Congressional Record, LXXX, 10677.
43ibid.
44lbid. at 10657.
43u.S. Congress, Senate, 75th Cong., 1st sess., Jan. 6, 1937, 
Congressional Record. LXXXI, 65.
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in this field was to be limited to "labeling'* which was defined as "all 
labels, and other written, printed or graphic matter (1) upon any 
article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such
article."46
The bill now met only minor opposition, most of it objecting 
to the delegation of powers to Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace.4̂  
But the measure passed the Senate and was sent to the House. The House 
committee reported favorably, and it passed to a conference committee to 
resolve minor amendments- The Copeland Act passed on June 15 and became 
law on June 25, 1938.
So the Food and Drug Administration received far greater powers 
under the Copeland Act, although control of "advertising" was not 
among them. The regulation of cosmetics (defined as any substance 
intended to enhance personal beauty except toilet soap) had previously 
been subject to the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 only if medicinal 
claims were made for them.4® But in the area of consumer protection 
against false and misleading packaging and promotion, the control of 
"labeling" became a major function, though labeling of "non-official" 
proprietary drugs (those not listed in the United States Pharmacopeia 
of National Formulary) did come under s u p e r v i s i o n . 49
4%he Copeland Act, 52 Stat. 1041 (1938).
4^Dunn, The Federal Food. Drug, and Cosmetic Act, pp. 834-38.
4®Paul C. Olsen, Marketing Drug Products (New Brunswick, N.J.: 
Rutgers University Press, 1948), p. 58.
49lbid.. pp. 59-60.
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The Copeland Act upgraded standards significantly— particularly 
in areas of safety— but the law fell short in some other respects. The 
following deficiencies, with respect to marketing, were to proveI
particularly troublesome:
1. A drug manufacturer was not required to establish efficacy 
as well as safety.
2. If the FDA could not act upon a manufacturer's request 
to market a new drug within 180 days, approval had to 
be automatically extended. ,
3. There was no provision requiring regular record keeping 
and reporting of clinical experience.
4. After a drug had been marketed, the burden of proof in 
removal for unsafety was on the FDA.
5. Prescription drug advertising had come under the 
control of the FTC.
6. There was no requirement to associate trade names with 
common generic names for drug products.50
The Copeland Act did go far in protecting the public in some 
areas, particularly in standards of production techniques and in control 
and inspection. However, control of advertising, the goal of Dr. Wiley 
and later of Senator Copeland, had-not been realized. The FDA simply 
could not do anything in this field even when the FTC could not or 
would not.
The battle between supporters of the various regulatory organi­
zations had resulted in small victories for almost everyone, yet it left 
a legacy of separation of power and responsibility for federal regulation 
as a whole. The control of "advertising" and "labeling" had been 
separated very precisely in the legislation, though the practical
^(^Wyndham Davies, The Pharmaceutical Industry: A Personal Study
(London: Pergaraon Press, Ltd., 1967), p. 69.
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definitions of these words were sufficiently ambiguous to ensure con­
fusion. The situation obviously demanded judicial interpretation, as 
had the imprécisions of the FTC Act of 1914. But when the matter of 
demarcation of responsibilities did finally reach the courts, the 
decisions resulted in jurisdictional chaos.
The first major case to damage the integrity of the spheres of 
responsibility laid down for the FTC and the FDA by Congress in 1938 
involved one Royal Lee, d.b.a. Vitamin Products Company (United States 
versus Lee, 131 F.(2d) 464, 466). The defendant, Lee, had a number of 
circulars printed which presented therapeutic claims for his drug 
products, asserting that they would, in the court's words "cure and 
constitute adequate treatments for human a i l m e n t s . T h e s e  circulars 
were sent in interstate commerce, but separately from the products 
themselves.
The District Court held that this was advertising within the 
meaning of the FTC Act, providing that "false advertising" means an 
advertisement other than labeling.Especially important was the fact 
that the materials did not actually accompany the goods.
The Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in November, 1942, that the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 was "enacted to protect the
public health and to prevent fraud, and it ought to be given a liberal 
53construction." The court supported its decision with this statement:
^^United States v. Lee, 131 F.(2d) 464 (1938).
52lbid.
53lbld. at 466.
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The contention assumes that printed matter (such as a circular) 
cannot constitute both advertising and labeling. The assumption 
is unwarranted. Most, if not all, labeling is advertising.54
The fate of the compromise of 1938 was thus mortally threatened. Although 
this case was not appealed, the Supreme Court was to seal this judgment 
six years later.
Meanwhile the federal courts extended wide latitude to the 
Federal Trade Commission in its role as an arbiter of fairness in adver­
tising. In Aronberg versus Federal Trade Commission (132 F.(2d) 165), 
also in 1942, the court confirmed the Commission's authority to practice 
judgment over intangible advertising appeals, recognizing that the 
ultimate impression upon the mind of the reader arises from the sum total 
of not only what is said but also of all that is reasonably i m p l i e d . ^5 
Noting that the people, as a whole, are not experts in grammatical con­
struction, the court maintained that "the law is not made for experts 
but to protect the public— that vast multitude which includes the 
ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, in making purchases, 
do not stop to analyze but too often are governed by appearances and 
general impressions."^^
This, of course, is essentially what Dr. Harvey Wiley had in­
sisted in 1906. Then, in 1943, the courts disposed finally of the 
constitutional question and of the Commission's fact-finding powers in
54lbld. (Alî o see United States v. Research Laboratories,
126 F.(2d) 42) (1942).
^^Aronberg v. Federal Trade Commission, 132 F.(2d) 165 (1942).
56lbid.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
61
one paragraph (American Medicinal Products, Incorporated et al. versus 
FTC, 136 F. (2d) 426). The defendant, the court pointed out, was not
I
required to reveal trade secrets by advertising because they were not
required to advertise at all. The FTC had simply and constitutionally
ordered them to cease advertising untruthfully.^7
So, although the courts now formally recognized the intentions
and authority of Congress in this field, they could not certify the
advertising-labeling political compromise contained in the Wheeler-Lea
and Copeland Acts. Thus, in 1948, the Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Royal Lee case of 1942
with its 5-4 decision in Kordel versus the United States (93 S.Ct. 52).
Again the court was called upon to determine if promotion material, in
this case sent not only separately but some eighteen months later than
the goods, constituted advertising or labeling in the sense of the Acts
of 1938. The court said:
We have searched the legislative history in vain, however, 
to find any indication that Congress had the purpose to 
eliminate from the Act advertising which performs the 
function of labeling. Every labeling is in a sense
advertising.58
While deciding in both the Royal Lee and Kordel cases in favor 
of the FTC, the courts had, in effect, refused to sanction a division of 
authority. The Supreme Court was certainly expressing its displeasure 
with the advertising-labeling dispute when it again held in favor of
^^American Medicinal Products, Inc. et al. v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 136 F.(2d) 426 (1943).
^^Kordel v. United States, 93 S.Ct. 52 (1948).
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the FDA, that "labeling" may include non-simultaneous shipments, and 
noted that "the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act is not concerned with the 
purification of the stream of commerce in the abstract, and the problem 
with which it is concerned is a practical one of consumer protection, 
not dialectics."59 Thus the ultimate tribunal for determination of 
the legal intent of the Acts of 1938 had, by 1948, held that non- 
simultaneous shipments of promotional matter can be advertising under 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, and/or can be labeling 
under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.
59unlted States v. Fred Urbutet, 93 L. Ed. 61 (1948)
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CHAPTER V 
SOME RECENT EVENTS
The years following the passage of the Wheeler-Lea and Copeland 
Acts were somewhat anticlimactic. The period 1948-1959 brought little 
progress of substance in the movement to control drug advertising. The 
Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration (now an 
independent agency^) did issue directives and orders against specific 
practices of individual advertisers. However, the serious problems of 
flagrantly false advertising, of FDA-FTC jurisdictional areas, and of 
legal delays remained and were inhibitory to aggressive regulation.
To further confuse the regulatory situation, by the middle of 
the decade 1950-1960 other government organizations were becoming 
involved. The Post Office Department exercised its jurisdiction over 
fraudulent advertising sent through the mails; the Treasury Department 
had some degree of control over products containing alcohol (which many 
suspension and solution drug preparations do); the Federal Communications 
Commission was increasingly uncomfortable about some of the proprietary 
drug advertising being broadcast.
As more agencies entered the field of advertising regulation, 
the situation grew proportionally more confused. No two agencies had
^The Food and Drug Administration had been transferred out of 
the Department of Agriculture in 1940 and had become one of the agencies 
and commissions in the Federal Security Agency. (See James S. Turner, 
The Chemical Feast [New York: Grossman Publishers, 1970].)
63
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the same procedural methods ; none had blanket powers over all of even 
one type of advertising. Each followed different"standards of proof 
and different statutes; investigative work done by one agency could not 
be used by any other and had to be duplicated; none (even the FCC) 
possessed capabilities to deal with the realities of large-scale 
mass communications.
The Kefauver Committee investigated the situation in the drug 
industry for three years in the early I960's. This work resulted in 
an amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act which required compliance 
with the following major points concerning drug advertising.
1. Substantial evidence of therapeutic efficacy as well as 
safety.
2. That a responsible officer of each firm sign a sworn 
statement attesting the accuracy of clinical data 
used in advertising and labeling of prescription drugs,
3. That all promotion include necessary warnings, contra­
indications, side effects, and untoward reactions, and 
that all labeling carry all necessary information for 
prescribing.
4. That jurisdiction over the advertising of prescription  ̂
products be assumed by the Food and Drug Administration.
Thus the regulation of ethical drug advertising became an
effective instrument of public policy. But controls over proprietaries
still depend, for the most part, on the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938. The
Federal Trade Commission has taken action in some cases involving
proprietary preparations, but a number of possible abuses remain
unhindered. Cold and flu preparations often claim some degree of
"cure" when they are only palliatives. Diet control preparations
^Mintz, The Therapeutic Nightmare, pp. 106—10.
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sometimes contain dessicated thyroid— which may not be safe for some 
common conditions. Headache preparations claim effectiveness for 
discomforts unrelated to the headache. Some laxatives do not warn 
adequately of the dangers of some stomach and bowel problems. Caffeine, 
while being scrutinized as a contributing agent in heart disease, is 
virtually ignored in soft drinks.
In March of 1969 the Federal Trade Commission made public the 
"Proposed Guides for Advertising Over-the-Counter D r u g s . T h e s e  
proposals have not yet been completely implemented, but more aggressive 
action based on prior legislation and case law has become evident. 
Nevertheless, the matter of proprietary advertising is not yet in hand.
At present there is no requirement to prove efficacy; no really 
scientific in vivo or in vitro clinical data are required; side effects 
and reactions are often effectively ignored. It is probable that the 
Federal Trade Commission does not have the resources, in manpower or 
funds, to challenge the power of the large consumer products companies 
if it were necessary.
But with the increasing interest and action in the field of 
consumer affairs, more aggressive and effective movement toward necessary 
control may be expected. As has been proven in other fields,all that 
is required is the commitment in manpower and resources to achieve 
honest, undeceitful drug advertising that informs rather than 
misinforms or confuses.
^Federal Trade Commission, Proposed Guides for Advertising 
Over-the—Counter Drugs, Section 7914.10, Number 421—31, July 8, 1969, 
pp. 12,869-12,873.
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION
j The primary difficulty throughout the relatively short history
of the regulation of drug advertising in the United States has been 
one of jurisdictional confusion. There appear to be two identifiable 
points in time at which the problems of regulation could have been 
resolved with the correction of jurisdictional misunderstanding.
While Dr. Harvey Wiley's Bureau of Chemistry certainly did not 
receive sufficient authority in 1906 and derived little assistance from 
the Sherley Amendment of 1912, the problem of jurisdiction began with 
the formation of the Federal Trade Commission in 1914. It was at this 
point that the Congress created a division of authority. It may not 
have been the intention of Congress to endow the FTC with power over 
false advertising, but it is not surprising that the warrant to 
oversee "unfair methods of competition" came to include supervision 
of advertising. A strict delineation of authority might have avoided 
the eventual problem of FTC-FDA overlap.
A second point of correction might have been in the Congress of 
1938. Although by that time both the Pure Food and Drug Department and 
the Federal Trade Commission had their individual champions in Congress, 
it was clearly the point to settle, rather than aggravate, the juris­
dictional question. The legislation affecting the FDA and FTC is even 
less understandable at that point because there was experience that 
had demonstrated the problems of authority and jurisdiction and there 
was, in fact, substantial discussion of the subject. The deliberate
66
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continuance of jurisdictional vagueness, as well as the "advertising- 
labeling" question, resulted in years more of inefficiency in 
regulation.
Thus, though the problems might have been corrected at any 
time, we may see the legislative periods of 1914 and 1938 as'the points 
at which the opportunities for an efficient regulatory system were 
greatest, and were lost.
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